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Bioethics is a relatively new discipline. It arose in direct response 
to the moral and ethical questions raised by the events of the 
Holocaust during World War II and by the rapid expansion of 
scientific knowledge in medicine.1-3 Modern bioethics takes as a 
starting point the traditional canons and teaching about the mo-
rality of medicine that are found in all the ancient civilisations of 
the world. However, bioethics cannot rely on the old adages and 
codes because the ethical dilemmas created by new technology 
and knowledge in medicine are unique in human existence. The 
coming together of moral philosophers, theologians, lawyers, ac-
tivists and clinicians has created a new field that has impacted on 
both moral philosophy and clinical practice. This cross-fertilisation 
has encouraged debate about ethical and moral epistemology in 
clinical practice. The most prominent current approach to medi-
cal ethics is known as the four principles approach and has been 
championed by Beauchamp and Childress in the USA and Gil-
lon in the UK.2-6 The rise of the four principles has tended to cast 
the relevance of moral theories and epistemology into doubt. The 
prominence of the four principles has resulted in an emerging cri-
tique of the approach. This article will examine the problems with 
the four principles and review the major competing ethical theories 
in an attempt to identify ways to integrate the classic moral theo-
ries and the four principles. 
The four principles and their 
opponents 
Beauchamp and Childress’s are the most well-known proponents 
of the four principles approach, and their influential textbook Prin-
ciples of Biomedical Ethics is currently in its 6th edition.2,3 It is 
widely read and taught in medical school curricula and applied 
ethics courses. Beauchamp and Childress distinguish between 
moral norms that the authors assume we all share and have im-
bibed during our upbringing, such as do not steal, do not lie and do 
not kill the innocent, and ethical theories that attempt to integrate 
morality into an overarching theory or model. They refer to beliefs 
that we all hold as the common morality. This is not based on com-
plex philosophical theories but on common sense. They refer to 
these as middle-level principles and state that they are not ranked 
in any order of importance. The principles are respect for autono-
my, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice and are believed to 
cut across differences of culture, class and nationality and provide 
a unifying moral framework and language derived from a common 
cohort of prima facie moral commitments. 
Critics contend that the four principles are vague and abstract 
and result in a formulaic approach to ethical debates. Furthermore, 
the principles occasionally come into direct conflict with each other 
and there is little guidance as to how to resolve these conflicts. 
For example, a patient with a gangrenous leg refuses amputation 
and discharges herself from hospital. She returns ten days later in 
a diabetic coma and her family insist that the doctors should am-
putate her leg and save her life. However, it is documented in the 
notes that ten days earlier while she was of sound mind she had 
refused an amputation. This is a real-life case where the two prin-
ciples of autonomy and beneficence come into direct conflict.  The 
principles themselves provide no mechanism to resolve conflict.7 
Beauchamp and Childress attempt to provide guidance here by 
introducing the concepts of specification and balancing.2-7 Speci-
fication involves making the specific content of a given principle 
explicit. If there is a conflict between the individual principles, then 
the ethicist is expected to balance these claims. They provide the 
following list of conditions that must be met before a prima facie 
norm can be overridden: 
•    Better reasons can be offered to act on the overriding norm than 
the infringed norm.
•    The moral objective justifying the infringement has a realistic 
prospect of achievement.
•   No morally preferable alternative action can be substituted.
•    The form of infringement selected is the least possible, com-
mensurate with achieving the primary goal of the action.
•    The agent seeks to minimise the negative effects of the infringe-
ment.
De Marco feels that the specification approach raises more 
questions than answers, as it usually results in the subversion of 
one of the conflicting principles.8,9 He quotes the example of the 
conflict caused by Jehovah’s Witness parents who attempt to deny 
their child a potentially life-saving blood transfusion. He attempt-
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ed to introduce a fifth principle, namely the ‘mutuality principle’, 
which is much less confrontational, reconciles conflicting princi-
ples and allows for progress. Holm, however, is sceptical about 
the above list of conditions.10 He demonstrates this by applying 
a so-called ‘not test’ to the conditions. By asserting the opposite 
of each condition, he shows that the list is tautological, self-refer-
ential, bland and uncontroversial. Holm goes on to state that the 
principles approach as a structure for moral reasoning is flawed 
as it cannot give definite answers to moral problems and may be 
able to provide justification for almost any answer chosen. Harris 
has dismissed the four principles as a mere checklist for ethics 
committees without substantial ethical support.11 He contends that 
the principles are not very good at detecting errors and inconsist-
encies. Harris uses the issue of cadaveric organ transplantation 
as an example of how the four principles with their emphasis on 
autonomy result in uncontroversial and unhelpful conclusions. In 
discussing the ethics of non-related cadaveric organ transplanta-
tion Gillon comes to the conclusion that autonomy mandates that 
informed consent from surviving relatives is necessary prior to or-
gan harvesting.6 Harris responds that this places the autonomy 
of a deceased person above the need for distributive justice. In 
light of the ongoing shortage of suitable organs for transplantation 
worldwide, Harris feels that the four principles lead to an unsatis-
factory outcome.
The issue of universal applicability of the four principles ap-
proach is also disputed by critics. Holm argues that it is obvious 
that Beauchamp and Childress have based their principles on an 
American concept of morality.10 He wonders whether this is trans-
ferable to other societies, arguing that the issue of beneficence in 
a Scandinavian country with a well-developed social welfare sys-
tem is different to that in the USA, where social welfare is poorly 
developed. There is great deal of discussion about the meaning of 
non-maleficence and beneficence. Non-maleficence is a passive 
principle and should be universally applied.1,2 Beneficence is an 
active principle, and to fulfil it requires a degree of sacrifice on the 
part of the moral agent. Not pushing a person into a swimming 
pool is an example of non-maleficence; it requires no action on the 
part of the moral agent. Rescuing someone from a swimming pool 
requires action and a degree of risk for the moral agent. Beau-
champ and Childress go to great lengths to quantify exactly how 
much risk or loss a moral agent can be expected to experience 
before legitimately being allowed to abandon the moral action.2,3 
The principle of justice creates similar problems.12 There are con-
tending claims as to what justice is. These range from egalitarian 
socialist-type approaches to libertarian approaches. Is it just that 
wealth should be forcibly taken from those who have, to pay for 
the care of those who do not? What is the role of redistributive 
justice in the world? Generally in the USA many people subscribe 
to a very libertarian approach and are opposed to state welfare 
programmes. Singer tries to steer a middle path by stating that 
as a rule 10% of annual income should be set aside for society. 
Anything more than this would be excessive.12
Beauchamp and Childress themselves acknowledge many of 
these problems. They refer to the application of ethical theories to 
concrete cases as practical ethics, stating ‘We have not attempted 
a general ethical theory and do not claim that our principles mimic, 
are analogous to or substitute for the foundational principles in 
leading classical theories.’ They go on to say that ‘even the core 
principles of our account are so scant that they cannot provide 
an adequate basis for deducing most of what we can justifiably 
claim to know in the moral life’.2,3 It would seem that while the four 
principles are useful, they are in themselves incomplete. In light 
of these problems with the four principles, are there other moral 
theories that may provide guidance in ethical decision making in 
modern medicine? 
There are several approaches to moral epistemology that must 
be considered.13 The three modern approaches are deontological 
(duty-based) consequentialist or utilitarian approaches and human 
rights-based approaches. The pre-modern approaches are a teleo- 
logical approach often referred to as virtue ethics and casuistry. 
Deontological or Kantian ethics
Kant is often regarded as the most important of the enlightenment 
philosophers.13-15 He lived an uneventful life in a small town in East 
Prussia away from any of the great cities of the day. He was a 
devout Protestant, but he was determined to set morality free of 
theology. He felt that religion had led to the wars of the Reforma-
tion and was divisive. He believed that moral law corresponded to 
human reasonableness and refused to allow that moral law had 
its origin in divine or natural law. He believed that moral principles 
were a priori synthetic and were inherent in each human being. 
He proposed the concept of a categorical imperative that a moral 
human being had to obey.15 This was a deontological philosophy 
that asks the question, ‘What ought I to do?’ The moral human 
being had a duty to follow the categorical imperative regardless of 
outcome of situation. 
What is a moral imperative? Kant defined the categorical im-
perative as a choice we can universalise. For example, telling the 
truth is a moral imperative as every single human being should 
tell the truth. Keeping a promise is another one. If an individual 
felt that one should tell a lie if one could get away with it, then this 
is not a categorical imperative as it cannot be universalised. In 
other words, if everyone lied the whole system of contracts and 
agreements would break down. Therefore one cannot wish to uni-
versalise the principle of lying. Kant also proposed the principle of 
human beings as an end in themselves. One cannot treat a human 
being as a means to an end. For example, prostitution is wrong 
because a human being is used purely to provide sexual pleasure. 
‘Act as if the maxim of your action was to become through your will 
a universal law. Act in such a way that you always treat humanity 
whether in your own person or in the person of any other never 
simply as a means but at the same time as an end. So act as if you 
were through your maxims a law making member of a kingdom of 
ends.’ In some ways this is similar to Christ’s injunction to ‘Do unto 
others as you would have them do unto you.’ Kant is not interested 
in consequences but only in the act. This creates ethical dilem-
mas. Let us say that we are in Rwanda in 1994 and are hiding 
some refugees in our house from the militia. If the militia surround 
us and ask if we are hiding any refugees, how should a moral 
person respond? Would it be acceptable to tell a lie? Kant would 
say no, as telling the truth is a categorical imperative. One must 
answer truthfully regardless of the consequences. The opposing 
broad school of thought from the enlightenment is the consequen-
tialist school or utilitarianism. 
Utilitarian ethics
Kant avoided looking at the consequences of a moral action. This 
rigid deontology is unacceptable to utilitarians.13,14 The utilitarian 
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philosophers were interested in the consequence of an act, not 
the act itself.16,17 They believed that as a principle we should al-
ways try to maximise pleasure and minimise pain. However, the 
utilitarians need to be able to define what is pleasure and what is 
pain. The utilitarian philosophy is that humanity at all times seeks 
pleasure and attempts to avoid pain. Jeremy Bentham, who was 
a great social reformer, is regarded as the originator of this con-
cept.16 Bentham tried to quantify pleasure to be derived from an act 
by developing a utility calculus. This could be used when decid-
ing to invest or allocate limited resources. For example, in rescu-
ing people from a burning building, whose life should be saved 
first, the pregnant woman or the elderly pensioner? The difficulty 
comes in predicting the benefit of the action. Mill took this concept 
further and attempted to divide pleasure up into higher and lower 
forms of pleasure.17 Basic bodily requirements such as eating food 
and sleeping were lower pleasures or goods, whereas intellectual 
pursuits such as writing were higher pleasures. The difficulty with 
utilitarian approach is in quantifying pleasure and benefit.
Human rights
Grotius recognised that if natural law existed all human beings 
were equal and there would be inherent rights that each human 
subject enjoyed.14 Grotius was concerned that the rights of the 
state often overrode the ordinary moral considerations. He felt that 
human nature and utility were not in conflict, as one could only 
establish laws that were in accordance with human nature if one 
wished to promote utility. The argument is that utility cannot stand 
alone from human nature as it is only by understanding human 
nature that one can determine the utility of an act.
Grotius felt that each human being was an independent mor-
al entity. This meant that each human possessed specific moral 
qualities, which makes moral action possible. These moral quali-
ties are rights. This changed the emphasis of the individual away 
from a system of moral inter-relationships and obligations to one 
of independent moral significance, opening the door to the social 
contract theories of Hume and Locke, which stated that the state 
is given power by the consent of the individual citizens, who are 
free moral agents capable of entering freely into binding agree-
ments. This emphasis on the individual was weakest when it came 
to discussing the issue of obligations. Modern rights theories have 
become an entrenched part of modern life. However, some of the 
problems associated with the four principles also apply to a human 
rights-based approach. There is no way of grading human rights. 
We all enjoy them equally and must be left alone to enjoy our rights 
provided that we don’t interfere with anyone else’s rights. For ex-
ample, the right to view pornography is protected as the right to 
freedom of expression, but the right of someone else not to be ex-
posed to pornography is equally valid. How does society balance 
these rights? A right that is unenforceable is not a right. The South 
African constitution is very human-rights based, but some of the 
rights such as the right to health cannot be guaranteed to every 
citizen. Other factors such as wealth and access to resources will 
impact on a citizen’s right to life. The utilitarian approach is one 
that attempts to weigh up and ascribe values to each right to de-
cide which right trumps the other. 
Virtue ethics
The origin of Western moral epistemology is in the society of An-
cient Greece.18-20  Aristotle believed that life has a goal or purpose. 
This is known as a teleology. The goal of life was to pursue the 
good, and once the good had been achieved a human being would 
experience happiness. Aristotle saw human beings as consisting 
of a complex of a body and soul. He saw the good life as one spent 
using reason and the intellect and believed that the virtues were 
necessary for a good life. To achieve the good and happiness it is 
necessary that a human being has the virtues. The virtues are ac-
quired by habit and developed by performing virtuous acts. Aristo-
tle divided the virtues into moral virtues and intellectual virtues. Ex-
amples of intellectual virtues include wisdom and intelligence. The 
moral virtues included liberality, temperance and courage. Aristotle 
believed that a sense of balance was important and that practical 
wisdom requires that we be able to read individual situations in a 
morally correct way, since morality requires us to make particular 
decisions. He felt that we need to have an emotional balance and 
that this required proper training and developed the concept of the 
mean. Courage was a virtue, but there was a spectrum ranging 
from foolhardiness to cowardice. A mean was a choice between 
two extremes. However, Aristotle’s list of virtues reflects the Greek 
concept of gentlemanly behaviour. He included wittiness and man-
ners in his list of virtues, hence betraying his own social origins 
– he was a Greek gentleman of the time. This has often been 
criticised as a self-satisfied approach on the part of a man who 
never expected that his concept of the good life could ever extend 
to slaves or women or barbarians. His virtues are those of a typical 
upper class gentleman of leisure, not a labourer or farmer. 
Casuistry
Casuistry was an approach to morality that avoided absolutes 
and relied on cases to discuss difficult points of morality.20,21 The 
heyday of casuistry was the 17th century. Casuistry became fa-
mously associated with the Jesuits and fell into disrepute when 
Blaise Pascal accused the Jesuits of being lenient on wealthy 
and powerful wrongdoers but applying the letter of the law when 
it came to the poor and powerless. However, the methodology of 
casuistry is well suited to practical medical ethics. The publication 
of The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning in 1988 
lead to revival of interest in casuistry.20,21 In the introduction the 
authors reflected on the experiences of ethical review boards made 
up of diverse members with different cultural and religious back-
grounds. Despite this they generally achieved a remarkable degree 
of consensus on contentious issues discussed at their meetings. 
Toulmin went so far as to state that medicine saved the life of eth-
ics.21,22 Ethics in the early 20th century had become increasingly 
focused on analytical debate and on an emphasis on differences; 
it was medicine that brought ethics back to a universal discussion. 
While anthropologists analysed why the Bushmen of the Kalahari 
regarded disease as a message from the Gods, it was medical 
people who emphasised that disease is the common fate of all 
humanity and that there is no difference between appendicitis in a 
bushman in the Kalahari or a lawyer in New York. Medicine is an 
ancient profession, older than anthropology or the social sciences, 
and is universal in its concerns, not parochial.
The professions and morality
Although significant cultural, religious and class differences sepa-
rate individuals in modern multi-cultural societies, we have more 
in common than we care to admit. It took a practical subject like 
medicine to come to this understanding.21,22,23 A surgeon in France 
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or China who diagnoses and treats acute appendicitis is held to 
identical ethical norms by both patients. They will both expect the 
surgeon always to act in their best interests, not to lie about the 
operative findings and not to abandon them. These are universal 
expectations of a member of the medical profession. A profession 
is more than simply the accumulation of knowledge as facts, but 
is also about the human application of that knowledge. For many 
centuries medicine lacked knowledge but still functioned as a pro-
fession. The professions have a teleology or purpose and are ex-
clusive. Belonging to a profession separates a member from the 
rest of society. A soldier has unique duties and responsibilities. 
He cannot be tried by a civilian judge but only by a military one. A 
doctor has unique privileges and rights. A patient will expose them-
selves intimately to a doctor and will answer personal questions in 
full confidence that the doctor is bound by a code that makes this 
appropriate and will not be violated. The soldier looks for reward 
in terms of honour and glory that would mean little to a civilian. 
Similarly, the reward a doctor gets from knowing that she directly 
saved a life is something that very few other people will ever ex-
perience. However, belonging to these groups incurs obligations 
and risks. A soldier has to be courageous and knows that he will 
be asked to undertake dangerous actions that may result in his 
death or injury. He accepts these risks in return for membership 
and honour. A doctor knows that she will have to work long hours 
over weekends and public holidays, and that she may be exposed 
to infectious diseases such as bubonic plague or extensively drug-
resistant tuberculosis. These are risks that she must accept if she 
wishes to be a doctor.
What is it that separates the profession of medicine from the 
simple facts of biology if not the virtues?23 Medicine has always 
prided itself on producing men and woman who have a duty to 
something higher than self interest. As doctors we make a com-
mitment to the patient, an assurance that we will never abandon 
the patient, that we will never willfully harm the patient, that we 
will strive to do everything in our power in the interests of the pa-
tient. Medicine, which deals so intimately with humanity, has a very 
pragmatic approach within its framework of the virtuous doctor. It 
has always been prepared to co-opt new forms of knowledge and 
apply them to the task of healing. It adopted knowledge from the 
Arabian physicians in the 12th century, it adopted modern scien-
tific methods in the 19th and 20th centuries, and it has adopted 
moral theories as they have been developed. As a profession we 
practise the virtues of Aristotle, yet we are quick to turn to Kant 
when needed. When a junior doctor asks why she must come 
and do a ward round on a public holiday, the answer is because 
it is your duty – your categorical imperative. Similarly, medicine is 
happy to adopt utilitarianism when appropriate. When it comes to 
the allocation of scarce resources such as organs for transplant 
or intensive care beds, doctors make utilitarian judgements all 
the time. Who is more deserving of an ICU bed – a forty-year-old 
mother of three, a drug addict, a child with a diaphragmatic her-
nia? We have to make some sort of value judgement every day at 
work. So in a single day a doctor may move from Aristotle to Kant 
and on to Mill without ever breaking her moral code or being incon-
sistent. As long as we have a teleological reason for doing what 
we are doing, then there is a direction and our actions fit in with 
the teleological goal of achieving the good. A good doctor is not a 
rich doctor or necessarily a very skilled doctor, but rather one who 
lives her professional life according to the norms of the profession. 
These happen to coincide with Aristotle’s virtues, namely with wis-
dom, compassion and caring and concern for suffering humanity 
without regard for race or class. The king’s physician will attend to 
his royal personage and then go on to help the woodcutter’s wife 
in labour. It makes no difference if the doctor is a Jew, a Buddhist 
or a Muslim, the same moral code is binding. 
This teleological unity in the face of cultural diversity is not 
exclusive to the medical profession. Let us look once again at 
another profession, the military. Like medicine this is an ancient 
calling. Military people are set apart from civilians. Yet diverse ar-
mies form diverse cultural backgrounds find that they share similar 
codes of conduct. Whether the soldier is American or Finnish, In-
dian or Samoan, all look down on cowardice, all seek honour and 
all place emphasis on obeying orders. Mutiny and cowardice are 
terrible crimes in any army. The military and medicine are exam-
ples of how professions, based on a concept of the Aristotelian 
good, achieve this good by developing the virtues that transcend 
cultural diversity without changing cultural backgrounds. 
Conclusion
The rise of bioethics has been a response to the rapid progress 
modern medicine made in the half century following World War II 
and to the exposure of Nazi war crimes during the same war. The 
development of the discipline has taken place in an increasingly 
multi-cultural world and this has encouraged a move away from 
ethical theories towards a common morality approach of the four 
principles. Although these four principles appear to be uncontro-
versial and universal, closer examination reveals several prob-
lems. The classic ethical theories all have relevance to modern 
medical ethics and are in fact readily used in day-to-day practice 
by physicians in conjunction with the principles. This is in keeping 
with the profession’s traditional willingness to adopt new forms of 
knowledge as they arose over the centuries. However, it remains 
the teleology of the medical profession that allows this seamless 
integration of a variety of ethical theories into daily practice. It is this 
teleology that sets medical practice apart from other commercial 
pursuits. This teleology remains dependent on the virtues. If medi-
cine ceases to be a moral enterprise based on the virtues, then no 
amount of principles will prevent the development of abuses. 
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